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Abstract
Background: Very recent acts of terrorism in the UK
were perpetrated by ‘homegrown’, well educated
young people, rather than by foreign Islamist groups;
consequently, a process of violent radicalization was
proposed to explain how ordinary people were
recruited and persuaded to sacrifice their lives.
Discussion: Counterterrorism approaches grounded
in the criminal justice system have not prevented
violent radicalization. Indeed there is some evidence
that these approaches may have encouraged
membership of radical groups by not recognizing
Muslim communities as allies, citizens, victims of
terrorism, and victims of discrimination, but only as
suspect communities who were then further
alienated. Informed by public health research and
practice, a new approach is proposed to target
populations vulnerable to recruitment, rather than rely
only on research of well known terrorist groups and
individual perpetrators of terrorist acts.
Conclusions: This paper proposes public health
research and practice to guard against violent
radicalization.
Background
In this paper we propose that public health research and
practice can inform preventive strategies and interventions
against violent radicalization. The term ‘radical’ can mean
‘politically subversive’, ‘creative’, or ‘extreme’, without
necessarily being illegal, criminal, or a threat to society.
However, recent research and policies that address terror-
ism have used a more specific term, that of violent radica-
lization. Violent radicalization is conceptualized as a social
and psychological process, often facilitated by recruitment
and training, by which an individual becomes increasingly
committed to politically motivated violence, especially
against civilians (See Table 1 for definitions) [1,2].
The motivations and ideology of groups that undergo
violent radicalization are often specific to political, histor-
ical, social and cultural contexts that can shape their
extremist actions and the accompanying political rhetoric
[3,4]. Since 9/11, the term ‘violent radicalization’ has
been applied mostly to extreme Islamist groups as they
have claimed responsibility for the majority of recent ter-
rorist attacks across the world [4,5]. The public health
impact of terrorist acts arising from violent radicalization
includes direct consequences such as deaths, physical
injuries and psychological or mental injuries. The 9/11
attacks in 2001 killed nearly 3,000 individuals. The Lon-
don 7/7 bombings in 2005 killed 52 and injured close to
700. Between 2003 and 2010, suicide bombers in Iraq
killed 12,284 Iraqi civilians and injured a further 30,644.
The groups that claim responsibility selectively invoke
religious rhetoric to justify politically motivated violence
but they do not generally represent Muslim populations
or Islamic Fundamentalism [1,6-9]. Thus, a public health
response to political violence [10] will need to consider
that the majority of the victims globally are in fact Mus-
lim civilians [5,11]. However, psychological sequelae after
9/11 were found more generally among all populations
who had experienced personal losses of friends, relatives,
and jobs [12]. Other direct effects include bereavements,
loss of employment, economic damage, fear and distress.
Indirect effects include a diversion of resources to tackle
terrorism and rebuilding communities, social divisions
within communities along religious lines, restrictive
counterterrorism actions and inconvenience, discrimina-
tion against those perceived to be associated with terror-
ism, and of course the sending of and potential loss of
troops to international conflicts where terrorist related
activity is thought to arise. These consequences can also
be mapped using public health approaches, and are not
fully reviewed in this paper, which is devoted to
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understanding violent radicalization to mount effective
strategies to reduce the likelihood of future incidents.
Until the 7/7 London bombings, a widely accepted per-
spective in the UK and the US was that terrorist threats
originated from foreign radical Islamists, as in the 9/11
attacks [6,13]. After the 7/7 bombings in London, con-
cerns in the UK shifted towards reducing the threat from
a ‘third wave’ of ‘homegrown’ terrorists who were
recruited and radicalized within the UK; similar responses
were found in Canada and US and other European coun-
tries in response to similar incidents in those countries
[6,13,14]. For example, Crone and Harrow studied 228
individuals who participated in 65 Islamist terrorist plots
or attacks in the West between 1993 and 2008 [13]. They
found that the majority of these plots involved people who
had spent their formative years in the West and seemed to
operate independently of any terrorist organization [13];
although, in reality, the majority involved some organized
recruitment, training, or financing by external terrorist
organizations [13]. These trends pose a challenge that
requires a new response including population level
research of putative risk and protective factors for violent
radicalization (Table 2), rather than relying only on crim-
inal justice system evidence from convicted terrorists. This
paper discusses these risk and protective factors (Table 2),
and proposes a public health model of research and pre-
vention [10].
Discussion
The limitations of criminal justice approaches
Efforts to understand the motivations of terrorists and
the pathways leading to violent radicalization have lar-
gely adopted a criminal justice system framework. In the
UK, for example, the PREVENT strategy sought to
gather intelligence and facilitate the prosecution of any-
one thought to be associated with terrorism, guilty of
terrorist acts, or in possession of materials that might
assist terrorism. One consequence is an ethical dilemma
for many researchers trying to investigate terrorism and
violent radicalization as confidentiality cannot be offered
to research subjects if they reveal information about
possible terrorist acts. Indeed, researchers themselves
can be liable to prosecution if they fail to disclose infor-
mation to the authorities, or if any information they
acquire later transpires to be of importance in identify-
ing terrorists. Furthermore, researchers may themselves
come under suspicion if, during their investigations,
they examine websites or propaganda used by terrorists
[15,16]. These considerations can restrict the capacity of
researchers seeking to understand how sympathies for
violent radicals and terrorists emerge in populations,
and how vulnerabilities are exploited in recruitment
processes.
The criminal justice system approach assumes that the
legal system can effectively deal with crimes irrespective of
their origins and contexts, and that terrorism can be pre-
vented by criminal intelligence and a tailored judicial sys-
tem rather than through engagement with other bodies of
theory and practice. By contrast, we argue that epidemiol-
ogy, psychology, sociology and other behavioral sciences
can contribute important data towards prevention strate-
gies, which have been used in public health programs to
address violence. Such alternatives do not condone the
conduct of terrorists, but aim to investigate the wider
determinants of recruitment in vulnerable populations and
to identify the pathways to radicalization, rather than sim-
ply considering evidence from convicted terrorists and
only from criminal justice analysis [3,9]. A wider analysis
is necessary because, as Atran sets out, there is no short-
age of volunteers to join the ranks of martyrs in the Mid-
dle East, but the situation in the UK and in the US and
Canada is less well known and the process of violent radi-
calization and its impacts in populations are not fully
understood [3,9].
An exclusive emphasis on a criminal justice system
strategy may impede prevention. For example, counter-
terrorism initiatives by the British government stigma-
tized and alienated Muslim communities in the UK by
Table 1 Definitions
Term Definition
Radicalization The social and psychological process of increasing commitment to extremist political or religious ideology [1]
Violent
radicalization
The social and psychological process of increased and focused radicalization through involvement with a violent non-state
movement. Phases are (a) becoming involved with a terrorism group and (b) remaining involved in or engaged with in terrorist
activity [1]
Terrorism Participation in politically motivated violence or threat of violence, especially against civilians, with the intent to instill
widespread fear [2]
Disengagement The process whereby an individual has a change in role or function associated with reduction of violent participation, either
enforced (for example, imprisonment) or due to psychological factors (for example, disillusionment) [1]
Deradicalization The social and psychological process, or intervention, by which commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is
reduced to the extent that the individual is no longer at risk of involvement in politically motivated violent activity [1]
Counter-
radicalization
Interventions to prevent social or political radicalization, to prevent violent radicalization, or to disrupt involvement in terrorism
of those already radicalized [1]
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treating them as a conspicuous religious group that was
under suspicion rather than as allies in a preventive
strategy [17,18]. Counterterrorism policies, however well
intentioned, did not inspire confidence or attract sup-
port as they were seen as unjust and so they actually
damaged social cohesion by isolating a religious group
[17,18]. Social cohesion is the ability of a society to be
inclusive of all cultural and social groups, so that they
work co-operatively. It has many benefits including
everyone realizing their potential (human capital), and
greater social capital (a form of social wealth on which
society draws), and greater social support. Each of these
has been linked with better population health and more
equal and just societies, and also with less violent crime,
especially in US studies. Thus the support and engage-
ment of Muslim minorities is important to counter the
arguments of those who perceive the authorities as
unjust and discriminatory against Muslims. The experi-
ence from Canada is consistent with findings in the UK;
that not working with and through the population as a
whole will undermine counterterrorist strategies. In
Canada, a helpful public health intervention was the set-
ting up of a crosscultural round table on security. This
provides a forum for ongoing discussion with commu-
nity involvement and support, and it links policies
across other arenas of importance such as education,
health, and employment; the round table also assists in
determining when counterterrorism should focus on
violent radicalization linked with Islamist groups or all
extremist groups, given that not all terrorist attacks are
claimed by or linked to Islamist groups [19]. The initia-
tive in Canada provides an example of the importance
of complementing the criminal justice approach with a
public health approach to terrorism and violent
radicalization.
The public health approach
Definition and principles of public health
Public health, as defined by the UK Faculty of Public
Health, is ‘The science and art of promoting and protect-
ing health and well-being, preventing ill health and
prolonging life through the organized efforts of society’
[20]. Public health interventions are predominantly popu-
lation based. These emphasize collective responsibility for
health, health protection, and disease prevention, and
recognize underlying socioeconomic and wider determi-
nants of health and disease. The approach emphasizes
partnerships with all those who contribute to the health
of the population. Health improvement involves attention
to education, inequalities, housing, employment, life-
styles, family and community, and surveillance systems.
In prevention in public health, population level reduc-
tions in characteristics (or behaviors) that carry a small
individual risk for a particular illness lead to greater
reductions in the overall prevalence of that illness, when
compared with interventions on very few people who are
Table 2 Putative risk and protective factors
Factor Description
Risk factors Young people facing transitions: education, place, family, religion and so on
Cognitive and social openings to new influences
Social isolation and exclusion
Grievances about discrimination that may be personal, related to unfair treatment at work, access to health care or about other
inequalities in society
Unemployment
Migrant status and experiences before and after immigration
International conflict that is considered unjust against a group with which individual identifies on religious, national or cultural
grounds
Perceived threat to family and cultural group
Marginalized and traditional cultural identities
Discrimination thought to explain group inequalities in health and social status and access to wealth
Not able to negotiate needs and protest through non-violent and democratic means
Contact with influential or charismatic leaders who justify terrorism (for example, in prisons, or in schools or universities)
Protective
factors
Social support
Social cohesion
Social capital and trust in institutions
Feeling of safety and security in neighborhood
Integrated cultural identity
Employment success
Access to democratic means for negotiating needs and opinions
Access to critical religious leadership that can moderate and inform on legitimate religious perspectives
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identified as carrying a very high risk. This approach has
been applied to violence prevention so reducing the
mean levels of any particular risk factor in the population
[21]. For example, the World Health Organization’s Vio-
lence Prevention Alliance provides a public health frame-
work to investigate and understand the causes and
consequences of violence [21]. Similar approaches are
used by the Centers for Disease Control in the USA (see
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/overview/publi-
chealthapproach.html). However, extending such work to
tackle violent radicalization and terrorism is a natural
step but rare. Therefore, a similar approach can be
applied to violent radicalization (see Figure 1).
A public health approach to tackle violent radicalization
Public health approaches are already applied in bioter-
rorism and street violence (for example, knife crime
injuries) [2]; but in most countries, including the UK,
public health agencies have not yet taken up violent
radicalization as a focus of research and intervention. A
surveillance system can monitor deaths and injuries due
to terrorist actions, but might also include other risk
and protective factors for violent radicalization. For
example, risk and protective factors set out in Table 2,
and perceived discrimination in the population as a
whole or amongst specific segments of the population;
trust in authorities and in their counterterrorism
approaches; perceived or real economic inequalities pat-
terned by ethnicity or religious groups; and international
conflict in which the authorities appear to be biased or
unfair towards a specific migrant, religious or ethnic
group.
Global databases on violent radicalization and terror-
ism are being compiled but are generally restricted to
event counts, and are also subject to many potential
 To establish why violent 
radicalisation occurs by 
research on the causes & 
factors that increase or 
decrease the risk, and 
that can be modified 
through interventions 
(see Box 2). 
To implement effective & 
promising interventions in a 
wide range of settings. The 
effects on risk factors and 
the target outcome 
(consequences) should be 
monitored, and their impact 
and cost-effectiveness 
evaluated. 
Define the problem 
through the systematic 
collection of data about 
the magnitude, scope, 
characteristics & 
consequences of violent 
radicalisation 
To find out what works 
to prevent violent 
radicalisation by 
designing, implementing 
and evaluating 
interventions 
Figure 1 A public health approach to preventing violent radicalization.
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sources of bias and confounding. Dugan et al. describe
the development of the first open source database on
global terrorist incidents [22] and discuss the limitations
of these data: (1) most terrorists are not legally pro-
cessed for terrorist offences but for other related
offences, and most terrorism data are outside the realm
of domestic criminal justice systems. (2) Data collected
are also subject to politically determined priorities given
much of it is collected by government agencies; and most
data sources are not routinely available for researchers.
(3) Most research is based on secondary or tertiary
source data that do not meet academic standards.
An implication of these findings is that terrorist acts
are classified as being distinct from criminal acts. Whilst
terrorism is dealt with by criminal justice agencies, feed-
back and evaluation of programs is not easy to undertake.
Terrorism databases do not include measures of risk fac-
tors for violent crime and violent radicalization, which
are more common in populations; nor do these databases
link with other potentially important variables (which we
later discuss). Only by collecting a fuller range of relevant
variables (shown in Table 2 and new variables identified
through research in Figure 1) can a surveillance system
generate evidence about patterns of incidents and the
correlates at individual and population levels. More
research is required on relevant risk and protective fac-
tors for violent radicalization.
As well as measuring terrorist-related direct deaths and
injuries [21,23], it is important to study the psychological
effects of terrorist acts on public mental health and on
social cohesion [12]. Understanding psychological trauma
suffered by witnesses and casualties can inform how to
respond to terrorism in ways that encourage people to be
prepared, vigilant and informed without living in fear and
maximizing recovery from psychological problems [12].
Routine health surveys and censuses might ask about
aspects of violent radicalization and group cohesion as
relevant health and social issues, and not only as a crim-
inal justice issue. The International Classification of Dis-
eases and Centre for Disease Control now has codes for
deaths and injuries from terrorist acts; this offers a sys-
tem of monitoring closely aligned to other public health
surveillance programs. Its use may offer one mechanism
to look objectively at global terrorism-related deaths and
circumstances in which they occur [23]. This should
make the most severe effects of violent radicalization
(deaths and injuries) easier to monitor and relate these to
other contextual and demographic data at both ecological
and local levels.
Other important variables include fears about personal
safety when under suspicion and fears of being wrongly
accused of being a terrorist; these also can undermine
social cohesion and social capital, both of which exercise
important influences on the health and well-being of
populations and on risks of community violence [18,24].
We do not currently measure population indices of these,
or of grievance, intergroup prejudice, or international
conflicts, all of which have been implicated in terrorist
activities. Some health-related risk factors may also be
risk factors for violent radicalization. For example, discri-
mination is associated with poorer health [25,26]; and a
recent global analysis of discrimination experienced by
minorities shows economic discrimination is closely
related to domestic terrorism [27], and this may increase
the risks of international terrorism [28]. Discrimination
can also be a marker of social isolation in society, social
exclusion, and unemployment. These conditions make
young people vulnerable to extremist influences and
ideologies while weakening their ties with socially inclu-
sive influences [9]. A weakening of ties to healthy influ-
ences can occur during transitions such as migration,
maturation during adolescence, changes in schools or
universities, changes of employment, geographical mobi-
lity and religious conversions. McCauley and Moskalenko
describe how isolation can lead to radicalization through
a process of unfreezing of links and isolation from heal-
thier and safer networks, giving rise to openings to new
influences including gangs, cults and other ideologically
driven groups that provide powerful feelings of belonging
and loyalty and positive identity and self-esteem [4].
Maintaining a positive regard for the authorities and
healthier influences appears to be an important protec-
tive factor against violent radicalization in the first place;
therefore, nurturing strong identifications with healthier
influences is likely to be as important as minimizing con-
tact with gangs, cults, and networks associated with
violent radicalization.
Researching complex pathways to violent radicalization
Drawing on the approach taken by Weine and colleagues
to Somali-American youth [29] and Horgan’s pathways
to violent radicalization [1], we propose that a public
health approach needs to be applied at the population
level to engage a larger proportion of the population at
risk of violent radicalization. This recognizes that very
few people proceed all the way to committing a terrorist
act and that many influences that make this more likely
are potentially modifiable. This approach requires an
understanding of individuals’ and groups’ biographies,
identities and stories, the cultural influences on socializa-
tion and successful resettlement, and public and commu-
nity support for counter-radicalization. We propose that
this will yield greater gains than current approaches that
attempt to target only those already planning or commit-
ting terrorist acts, or those in contact with the criminal
justice system, neglecting the wider population base from
which terrorists are recruited and the networks with
which they are associated. The proposed approach also
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decreases the risk of stigmatization associated with profil-
ing, for which there is little empirical evidence of predic-
tive accuracy. Thus, pathways to violent radicalization
can be better understood if public health research investi-
gates promising new variables from the social and beha-
vioral sciences such as social inclusion, exclusion,
cultural identity and acculturation, stigma, discrimina-
tion, and political engagement [10,30]. It will be impor-
tant to test the predictive validity of these putative risk
and protective factors. For example, there is value in
measuring popular sympathies for violent radicalization
compared with levels of political engagement in the same
population, and to studying their relative effects on
health and on violent and non-violent protest.
An example of how these influences might interact is
found in the case of violent radicalization of youth in
Somali-American communities [29]. Between 2007 and
2008, an estimated 18 Somali-American adolescent boys
and young men left their homes in Minneapolis, without
knowledge of their friends or family, to join militant
training camps run by the Al Shabaab, an extremist
group in Somalia. Among them was 27-year-old Shirwa
Ahmed, who became the first known suicide bomber
with US citizenship when he detonated his car bomb in
an attack on a government office in Somalia. Taking a
public health and psychosocial approach, these Somali-
American youth may have been vulnerable to the appeal
of violent radical ideas because of war-related displace-
ment; fragmentation of family and community structures
when moving from Somalia to refugee camps, then to
settlement in the US; feeling trapped between dissonant
acculturative identities with insufficient adult guidance
from the immediate community and family; and identifi-
cation with a ‘warrior’ role adopted by some Somalis dur-
ing the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia [29]. Identification
of these risks for violent radicalization informed the
development of specific community appropriate interven-
tions [29].
This case study shows that violent radicalization can
be an outcome of a complex interaction between social,
political, cultural, historical, and interpersonal factors
[1,5,6,30-33]. As a result, research will need to include
religious variables, measures of conflict, measures of
acculturation and cultural identity, human capital and
migration-related factors. It is known that one outcome
of acculturation can be a more traditional identity,
which in some instances can be a form of protest
against a dominant culture that is perceived as unjust,
or a method to preserve familiar cultural practices and
roles in the face of uncertainty. Therefore, studies to
verify the risk factors of importance in violent radicali-
zation will require innovative methods to measure cul-
tural integration and citizenship, fair access to health,
wealth and material resources, alongside measures of
sympathies for, or condemnation of, different protest
groups as well as terrorist groups.
Early prevention of violent radicalization
Some studies suggest that violently radicalized individuals
are no more likely to have histories of deprivation, unem-
ployment, criminality or poverty than others in their wider
community [31,32]. If anything, they are better educated,
slightly younger and slightly more likely to be migrants
than the general population [31,32]. At the moment, it is
difficult to target preventive interventions at individuals
who plot terrorist attacks because they are not particularly
identifiable by demographic or personal characteristics, or
by psychopathology, and there is often no formal member-
ship structure or hierarchy among violent radicalized
groups [1,6,15,30-32]. However, evidence suggests that a
useful focus is on young people who are vulnerable to
radicalizing influences because of isolation or marginaliza-
tion, particularly as they are likely to be accessible to inter-
ventions while in full time education during adolescence
and young adulthood when identity-related psychological
and social transitions are common [4].
Given what is known so far about homegrown terror-
ism, preventive interventions should focus on how nego-
tiations of personal identity, social exclusion and
marginalization can generate grievances that are not pro-
cessed through political engagement, nor through demo-
cratic non-violent negotiations [3,11,9]. If grievances
emerge from experiences of discrimination and among
people with particular cultural identities (for example,
traditional or marginalized) then, like the plethora of
interventions to reduce discrimination and improve inte-
gration, violent radicalization should be amenable to a
public health approach. Research and practice would
need to encompass three elements: (1) the ongoing pro-
cess of changing personal and community affiliations in
relation to transnational ideologies, identities, histories,
events, traditions and cultures in order to promote inte-
gration which is known to yield health benefits through
social benefits; (2) social, immigration, human rights and
public health policies that can promote trust and social
and political engagement; and (3) violence prevention
and disaster management that involves all people in a
preventive strategy.
Educational policy may also be important for a variety
of reasons. Focusing counter-radicalization interventions
on secondary schools and centers of higher learning
could reach a wide social group at a formative stage
when many young people explore modes of engaging
with ‘radical’ and alternative perspectives, and many
grapple with identity issues. Young people face many
transitions in friendships, identity, and in their homes.
This is a crucial time of flux when individuals are begin-
ning to take a view on international events and on their
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own sociopolitical identity. Violently radicalized indivi-
duals tend to be younger and better educated than many
in their communities. Because terrorist recruiters target
educational environments and young people, counter-
radicalization interventions located in education may be
very well placed to protect individuals from induction
into violent radicalization [10,15,32]. The notion of
teaching healthy relationships, healthy lifestyles, citizen-
ship and good character in schools is not a new one.
However, adaptations may need to be made to accommo-
date the historical accounts and intergenerationally trans-
mitted narratives that vulnerable people absorb in their
homes and in their culturally defined communities
[33,34]. Stories told within communities and homes can
enhance feelings of prejudice and intergroup conflicts by
narrating and reactivating traumas associated with mon-
strous acts by others; all of these can then position the
identity of the child, family and community, along ethnic,
religious, cultural or demographics characteristics [34].
These narratives may differ from official historical
accounts that are taught and may be used by terrorist
groups to foster violent radicalization [33]. Thus schools
might need to address these concurrent, seemingly
incompatible, narratives while taking care to nurture
pride in the histories of marginalized communities. It is
also a responsibility for teachers and role models to
ensure that their own prejudices, assumptions, and family
stories are not automatically transmitted to the next gen-
eration. Because highly educated terrorists are more
likely to succeed [3,31] and kill more people when they
do [8], decreasing the violent radicalization of young peo-
ple in higher education may yield significant benefits in
public protection. Supportive evidence for such an
approach is found from studies in the Middle East, which
show that higher educational status is associated with
greater sympathy for violent radicalization and terrorist
movements [3].
Analyses suggest that growing up in politically radica-
lized communities is an important but insufficient factor
for violent radicalization [35-38]. Interventions that
reduce sympathies for violent radicalization may
improve social cohesion and non-violent political
engagement and vice versa. It is important to find ways
of preventing political moderates or the politically
uncommitted in a community from developing sympa-
thies for violent extremist ideologies based on perceived
attacks on their religion or identity group [3,10,37].
Engaging people from all political, religious, and demo-
graphic backgrounds is essential to ensure public sup-
port for social cohesion and public safety. This also has
wider health benefits of cohesive communities with
greater social capital and fair access to health, wealth
and material resources.
Conclusions
Applying a public health approach to the prevention of
violent radicalization in the population will include a
search for risk and protective markers that can be a focus
of interventions to minimize recruitment to violent radica-
lization. A public health approach has the potential to fos-
ter social inclusion and social justice in communities that
feel threatened by terrorism, to help destigmatize ‘suspect
communities’, and to identify and address common issues
of grievance or marginalization. In addition, a public
health approach can facilitate the identification of factors
to protect individuals from induction into violent ideolo-
gies during critical developmental periods. There will also
be wider health and social benefits where the risk factors
for violent radicalization are also risk factors for violence
and poor health in general and social inequalities.
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